Issues & Studies,
(monthly), "The Vietnam War as Seen From Peiping" by Fu-shun Lin—While both Peiping and Hanoi strongly uphold a hard-line position of resisting U.S. "aggression" to the end, there is a significant difference in their motivations and interests. The longer and harder the war becomes, the more Hanoi must suffer and the greater the danger to its very existence. The longer and harder Hanoi fights, the more Peiping will benefit without any significant cost. Peiping is generous with "oral" support but not enthusiastic about giving any substantial amount of material support. Peiping's threat to intervene in the war is motivated by self-interest rather than a desire to help Hanoi. Peiping has flatly refused to cooperate with Moscow in united action and the coordination of all efforts to assist Hanoi. This shows Peiping is more interested in humiliating the Soviet Union than in helping Hanoi.
The Chinese Communists seek to expel the United States from Asia. Hanoi's aim is more limited; it wants to expel the United States from South Vietnam, "liberate" the south, and unify Vietnam under the Communists. Peiping supports Hanoi's aims. But the Peiping goals are so ambitious, the approach so extreme, and the motivation so questionable that Hanoi has had second thoughts about endorsement. From Hanoi's point of view the Soviet Union's more moderate position may be preferable to Peiping's extremism.
Peiping also regards the war in Vietnam as an opportunity to embarrass and humiliate the Soviets. It is obvious that the Soviet Union has little to gain from the war and does not want escalation into a conflict in which it would be involved. Nevertheless, as leader of the Communist camp, Russia cannot afford to deny at least nominal support to a "brotherly" Communist country that is fighting against the United States. This makes the Soviet Union's position extremely vulnerable to Peiping attack.
Peiping has lost no time taking advantage of this Soviet dilemma. It has accused the Soviet Union of conspiring with the United States to sell out Vietnam, of perpetuating the partition of Vietnam, and of encircling mainland China militarily. It has charged that Russia's support to Hanoi is insufficient, exaggerated, maliciously intended. It rejected the Soviet proposal of a united front to support Hanoi and deliberately delayed and restricted the passage of Soviet arms through mainland China on the way to Vietnam.
These measures are designed to humiliate the Soviet Union and move toward Peiping leadership of the international Communist movement. By demonstrating its strong support for Hanoi and accusing the Soviet Union of conspiring with the United States, Peiping is in effect telling the peoples and countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America that only the Chinese people, a non- white race, can be true and reliable friends in the common struggle against the whites and against industrially developed countries. By forcing the Soviet Union to become more deeply involved in the war and to send supplies to Hanoi by sea instead of via the Chinese mainland, Peiping hopes to precipitate a clash between Russia and the United States.
As in Indonesia, Cuba, and a number of African countries, Peiping is losing its battle with Russia in the case of Hanoi. The main reasons are: (1) Peiping's position is so extreme and uncompromising that it leaves Hanoi with virtually no room to maneuver; (2) Peiping demands Hanoi decline Soviet aid, a condition Hanoi cannot accept; and (3) Peiping is more concerned with the promotion of world revolution than with helping Hanoi's war efforts.
Nevertheless, neither Peiping nor Hanoi can afford a total break. Even though unhappy about Hanoi's attitude toward Moscow, Peiping has tolerated and will continue to tolerate it for fear of being pushed out the Vietnam picture at a severe loss to its prestige and practical goals. Though irritated by Peiping's extreme position and questionable motives, Hanoi still hopes to exact as much material aid and "moral" support as possible. For Hanoi, Peiping constitutes a strong deterrent to a larger war and a supporter in the event of U.S. land action north of the 17th parallel. Hanoi and Peiping are allies of convenience.
Another important aspect of the Vietnam war is that Peiping regards it as a sign of U.S. intention to launch an armed attack against mainland China. Since the United States started bombing North Vietnam in February, 1965, Chinese Communist leaders frequently warned of expansion of the Vietnam war to the Chinese mainland and a U.S. attack on Red China. Peiping sees a partial encirclement in the build-up of large U.S. forces in South Vietnam, the intensification of air raids against the north, the construction of huge air bases in Thailand, the concentration of the U.S. 7th Fleet in the South China Sea, and existence of U.S. military establishments in the Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, South Korea, and Japan. Peiping also fears encirclement by a military alliance among the U.S. "imperialists", the Soviet "revisionists", the Japanese "militarists", and the Indian "reactionaries". In accusing the United States of preparing to attack mainland China, Peiping is trying to fan up Chinese hatred against the United States and pave the way for any military action the Chinese Red regime may decide to take in Vietnam or elsewhere.
Paradoxically, Peiping seems to welcome rather than fear the prospects of a clash with the United States. The Peiping regime seems to believe that the United States may be deterred from launching an attack against mainland China because of the determination of the resistance and the opposition of public opinion in the United States and elsewhere. Even if war comes, Peiping is confident it cannot be defeated and that the United States will be wiped out. Peiping also believes that unless the United States is expelled from Asia, world revolution is not possible, and that the United States can be expelled from Asia only through armed struggle or war. Thus Peiping must resort to armed force—even if that means an all-out clash with the United States-to accomplish its revolutionary goal in Asia. Peiping is putting disproportionate effort and resources into the development of nuclear striking capability in order to confront the United States.
Peiping is doing its best to make the Vietnam war a long and hard one to be fought out by the Vietnamese and the Americans. But has Peiping committed itself to help Hanoi fight against the United States? If so, what is the extent of the commitment? Peiping has been extremely careful not to make any definite commitment. An examination of all public statements by Peiping's leaders shows that only on a few occasions have they spoken of aid to North Vietnam. Peiping's position of giving massive "moral" support but limited material and military support has remained unchanged from the beginning of the Vietnamese war to the present. The Chinese Communist attitude toward the Vietnamese war has not won sympathy or support in Asian, African, and Latin American countries.
Viet Cong Weakening
Newsdom, (Sinwen Tienti Weekly),"Many Viet Cong Guerrilla Fighters Have Deserted" by Li Shih-teh—
Viet Cong documents seized by Vietnamese government troops in a mopping-up operation near Saigon reveal that in the last two years, the Viet Cong have lost more than 70 per cent of their control over the rural population in South Vietnam and that the number of their guerrilla troops has dropped from 300,000 to 180,000. These documents also disclose that to make up for the loss of personnel, the Viet Cong have decided to recruit women and children to fill some of the gaps.
The documents said that the relations between the Viet Cong and the people and among the Viet Cong themselves are worsening. Many people who live in Viet Cong controlled areas have refused to pay taxes to Communist organizations. The documents blamed the incompetence of Viet Cong leaders for the disintegration of their control. The documents also disclosed:
1. If the Viet Cong cannot solve the problem of the gradual loss of their control over the South Vietnamese people, they will face more difficult problems. Four-fifths of the funds needed by the Viet Cong has come from the Vietnamese people.
2. The Viet Cong fear the continuing increase in the strength of the Saigon government armed forces, especially at provincial levels.
3. Viet Cong influence in the Mekong delta, which has been considered their strongest base, is declining rapidly. The Viet Cong have lost the military initiative in six delta provinces.
The documents did not contain any suggestion for improvement. The Viet Cong are panic-stricken and in a dilemma. They could only say, "We must revolutionize our ideological leadership." In the Communist dictionary, this probably means that a purge will be carried out.
Hanoi-Peiping Split:
Political Review, fortnightly, "Hanoi Is Attempting to Break Away From Peiping" by Wang Yin-mao—
Vietnam has become a testing ground for Peiping and Moscow. If North Vietnam and the Viet Cong win and occupy South Vietnam, Peiping will unite most of the Communist countries in the world under Mao Tse-tung's banner and use them to oppose Moscow. But the Russians believe that South Vietnam can be conquered by infiltration and subversion and that there is no need of a war in which both sides will have to make great sacrifices.
This basic difference between Peiping and Moscow has caused a split among the Vietnamese Communist leaders and compelled them to review and revise their course of action. Hanoi's leaders probably think that Peiping wants the Vietnamese war. They understand that no matter how Peiping assails the United States and boasts of its own strength, the Chinese Communists do not want a direct clash with the United States.
There are many indications that Hanoi is trying to break away from Peiping's control. Hanoi dispatched a delegation to the 23rd Congress of the Russian Communist Party. The Chinese Reds refused to attend this meeting. If Ho Chi Minh is determined to oppose Peiping's pressure, Moscow's aid may push his relations with Peiping to the point of a complete break.
Confusion over policy, vacillation, and uneasiness are prevalent in Hanoi's leadership. This became clear during the peace offensive launched by the United States last December and January. Hanoi's leaders did not have a unified view on the suspension of U.S. air attacks on North Vietnam. A high-ranking Vietnamese Communist official admitted that Hanoi has considered peace negotiations. Those favoring war won out and turned down the proposals for peace negotiations.